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PATCHAK V. ZINKE, SEPARATION 
OF POWERS, AND THE PITFALLS 
OF FORM OVER SUBSTANCE 
MICHAEL FISHER* 
INTRODUCTION 
The inherent importance of the separation of powers in our 
constitutional system of governance has been recognized since its 
founding. James Madison noted that “[t]he accumulation of all 
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, 
whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-
appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of 
tyranny.”1 
The separation of powers in our system of government is designed 
to protect individuals.2 The Article III branch of government—the 
courts—determines when the principle of seperation of powers has 
been violated.3 In 2014, Congress passed the Gun Lake Trust Land 
Reaffirmation Act,4 which stripped Article III courts of jurisdiction 
over any actions relating to a specific piece of land: the Bradley 
Property. Congress’ passage of the Gun Lake Act and its ultimate 
decision to remove federal jurisdiction over “Bradley Property” cases 
raises the issue of separation of powers because it was passed on the 
heels of a 2012 Supreme Court decision granting Patchak5 prudential 
standing to challenge the fact that the Secretary had taken the 
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 1.  THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison). 
 2.  See Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 222 (2011) (“The structural principles secured 
by the separation of powers protect the individual as well.”). 
 3.  See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (“Deciding whether a matter has in any 
measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the 
action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed . . . is a responsibility of 
this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.”). 
 4.  Pub. L. No. 113-179, 128 Stat. 1913 (2014) [hereinafter “Gun Lake Act”]. 
 5.  Patchak was a resident of a property near the Bradley Property. 
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Bradley Property.6 Congress’ Gun Lake Act took jurisdiction of a case 
from federal courts on an issue the federal courts had already decided, 
but the D.C. circuit held that the act did not violate separation of 
powers principles.7 
This commentary will proceed by describing (1) how the bright-
line rules established in previous separation of powers cases compel 
the Court to rule in favor of the government, and (2) why more 
functionalist rules should replace the formalist rules currently guiding 
the courts in separation of powers cases because they would better 
safeguard individual liberties. Therefore, while the Court will most 
likely find no violation of its separation of powers doctrine in Patchak 
v. Zinke, it should consider the destructive implications of its current 
doctrine, and ultimately find a separation of powers violation. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians 
(the Gun Lake Tribe) is a Native American tribe situated in western 
Michigan.8 Though the tribe has a rich history of interacting with the 
United States government since the 18th century, the Department of 
the Interior did not formally recognize the tribe until 1999.9 Following 
its formal recognition by the government, the Gun Lake Tribe 
petitioned for a tract of land in Michigan, known as the Bradley 
Property, to be put into the trust of the Indian Reorganization Act 
(the “IRA”).10 This would allow the Tribe to construct a casino on the 
Bradley Property.11 The Bureau of Indian Affairs approved the 
petition in 2005, and the Gun Lake Casino opened on the Bradley 
Property in February 2011.12 
David Patchak is an American citizen who lives near the Bradley 
Property.13 In August 2008, Patchak filed a lawsuit against the 
Secretary of the Interior and the Assistant Secretary of the Interior 
 
 6.  Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 
228 (2012) (“The QTA’s reservation of sovereign immunity does not bar Patchak’s suit. Neither 
does the doctrine of prudential standing.”). 
 7.  Patchak v. Jewell, 828 F.3d 995, 999 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. The IRA “authorizes the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) to acquire property 
‘for the purpose of providing lands for Indians.’” Match-E-Be-Nash, 567 U.S. at 211. 
 11.  Patchak, 828 F.3d at 999–1000. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. at 1000. 
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for the Bureau of Indian Affairs under the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA).14 He sued on the grounds that he would be injured by the 
construction of the casino because it would “irreversibly change the 
rural character of the area, increase traffic and pollution, and divert 
local resources away from existing residents.”15 Patchak also argued 
that because the Tribe was not formally recognized until after the 
IRA was enacted, the Secretary improperly put the Bradley Property 
into trust for the Tribe.16 
While Patchak’s lawsuit against the Department of the Interior 
was pending, the Supreme Court in Carcieri v. Salazar17 held that the 
IRA “limits the [Interior] Secretary’s authority to taking land into 
trust for the purpose of providing land to members of a tribe that was 
under federal jurisdiction when the IRA was enacted in June 1934.”18 
Here, the Gun Lake Tribe was not under federal jurisdiction until 
1998.19 Thus, on its face, Patchak’s suit had merit: the Secretary putting 
the Bradley Property into trust for this tribe violated the principle 
underlying the Court’s decision in Salazar. 
In Patchak’s suit, the Gun Lake Tribe intervened as a defendant, 
and both the United States and the Gun Lake Tribe as co-defendants 
claimed that Patchak lacked prudential standing to bring the case.20 
The district court held that Patchak lacked prudential standing;21 
however, the Supreme Court held that Patchak had standing and 
remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings.22 
With the Supreme Court’s ruling on Patchak’s prudential standing 
in Salazar serving as a backdrop, on September 26, 2014, President 
Obama signed into law the Gun Lake Act.23 The Gun Lake Act, in 
 
 14.  5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 705 (2012); Patchak, 828 F.3d at 1000. 
 15.  Patchak, 828 F.3d at 1000. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009). 
 18.  Id. at 382. 
 19.  Patchak, 828 F.3d at 999. 
 20.  Id. at 1000. 
 21.  Patchak v. Salazar, 646 F. Supp. 2d 72, 78 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 22.  Match E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 
228 (2012). 
 23.  Patchak, 828 F.3d at 1000; see Pub. L. No. 113–179, 128 Stat. 1913, Sec. 2(a)–(c) (2014), 
which reads as follows: 
IN GENERAL.—The land taken into trust by the United States for the benefit of the 
Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians and described in the final 
Notice of Determination of the Department of the Interior (70 Fed. Reg. 25596 (May 
13, 2005)) is reaffirmed as trust land, and the actions of the Secretary of the Interior in 
taking that land into trust are ratified and confirmed. 
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short, stated that all claims relating to the Bradley Property must be 
dismissed. 
After the Gun Lake Act was passed, both parties filed motions for 
summary judgment.24 The district court ruled that Patchak’s suit 
pertained to the Bradley Property, and therefore the Gun Lake Act 
stripped the court of jurisdiction to consider Patchak’s claim.25 The 
court also rejected Patchak’s arguments that the Gun Lake Act 
violated constitutional separation of powers principles.26 The district 
court granted summary judgment in favor of the co-defendants and 
dismissed the case.27 
Patchak appealed the decision of the district court to the D.C. Cir. 
Court of Appeals. The court of appeals upheld the decision of the 
district court, rejecting the argument that the Gun Lake Act violated 
constitutional separation of powers principles.28 The Supreme Court 
granted Patchak’s petition for writ of certiorari on a limited basis.29 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
While many Supreme Court cases have dealt with separation of 
powers issues, several directly address Congress’s ability to change 
substantive law. 
A. United States v. Klein 
In United States v. Klein,30 the Court confronted a bill Congress 
passed in 1863 that stated that no Civil War pardon should be 
 
NO CLAIMS.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an action (including an 
action pending in a Federal court as of the date of enactment of this Act, relating to 
the land described in subsection (a) shall not be maintained in a Federal court and 
shall be promptly dismissed. 
RETENTION OF FUTURE RIGHTS.—Nothing in this Act alters or diminishes the 
right of the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians from seeking 
to have any additional land taken into trust by the United States for the benefit of the 
Band. 
 24.  Patchak, 828 F.3d at 1001. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Patchak v. Jewell (Patchak II), 109 F. Supp. 3d 152, 159 (D.D.C. 2015). 
 27.  Id. at 165. 
 28.  Patchak, 828 F.3d at 1001–03 (holding that Congress did not impermissibly direct the 
result of pending litigation or otherwise “encroach upon the judiciary” in enacting the Gun 
Lake Act). 
 29.  Patchak v. Zinke, 828 F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2091 (May 1, 
2017) (No. 16-498). Patchak raised various claims in his arguments in the district and circuit 
level cases. However, because the Supreme Court granted cert limited to only one question, the 
other issues raised will not be discussed here. 
 30.  80 U.S. 128 (1871). 
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admissible as proof of loyalty.31 Additionally, “acceptance of a pardon 
without disclaiming participation in the rebellion would serve as 
conclusive evidence of disloyalty.”32 Congress also sought to remove 
federal jurisdiction from pardon cases, and “directed the Court of 
Claims and the Supreme Court to dismiss for want of jurisdiction any 
claim based on a pardon.”33 Klein had received a pardon, and 
challenged the statute as violating the separation of powers.34 The 
Court ruled that Congress violated the separation of powers, as it 
“impair[ed] the effect of a pardon,” a power given “[t]o the executive 
alone.”35 Thus, the statute in Klein violated the separation of powers 
“not because it left too little for courts to do, but because it attempted 
to direct the result without altering the legal standards governing the 
effect of a pardon—standards Congress was powerless to prescribe.”36 
In other words, Congress was not authorized to pass the law to begin 
with. 
B. Robertson v. Seattle Audobon Society 
In Robertson v. Seattle Audobon Society (“Audobon”)37, the 
petitioners challenged a United States Forest Service action that 
harvested timber in areas the petitioners alleged were protected by 
federal statutes.38 In response, Congress passed § 318 of the 
Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations 
Act.39 Subsection (b)(6)(A) of the Act stated that compliance with 
that specific statute was sufficient for the statutory requirements of 
the statutes alleged to have been violated in Audobon.40 The 
 
 31.  Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1324 (2016). 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 1324. 
 34.  Klein, 80 U.S. 131–32. 
 35.  Id. at 147. 
 36.  Bank Markazi, 136 S.Ct. at 1324. 
 37.  Robertson v. Seattle Audobon, 503 U.S. 429 (1992). 
 38.  Id. at 432. 
 39.  Id. at 433. 
 40.  Pub. L. No. 101–121, 103 Stat. 701, 745–50 (1989). Subsection (b)(6)(A) reads: 
“[T]he Congress hereby determines and directs that management of areas according 
to subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of this section on the thirteen national forests in 
Oregon and Washington and Bureau of Land Management lands in western Oregon 
known to contain northern spotted owls is adequate consideration for the purpose of 
meeting the statutory requirements that are the basis for the consolidated cases 
captioned Seattle Audubon Society et al., v. F. Dale Robertson, Civil No. 89-160 and 
Washington Contract Loggers Assoc. et al., v. F. Dale Robertson, Civil No. 89-99 . . . 
and the case Portland Audobon Society et al., v. Manuel Lujan, Jr. Civil No.87-1160-
FR.” 
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petitioners objected “because it purported to direct the results in two 
pending cases, [and therefore] violated Article III of the 
Constitution.”41 
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating “that 
subsection (b)(6)(A) replaced the legal standards underlying the two 
original challenges with those set forth in subsections (b)(3) and (5), 
without directing particular applications under either the old or the 
new standards.”42 The Court rejected the argument that subsection 
(b)(6)(A) did not modify old requirements, as it deemed compliance 
with new requirements as sufficient to meet old requirements.43 The 
Court read subsection (b)(6)(a) instead as a “modification” of the 
statute in question.44 
The Court held that the Act, even with its reference to the specific 
case at hand, did nothing to direct any findings of fact or applications 
of law to fact.45 This was because the statute still required a judicial 
determination that the management of the areas was done “according 
to subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5).”46 Because Congress did not direct a 
specific result in this case, and because Congress changed the law 
without directing any particular result, the Act did not violate any 
separation of powers principles. 
C. Bank Markazi v. Peterson 
In Bank Markazi v. Peterson,47 respondents, victims of Iran-
sponsored terrorism, brought suit against Iran under 28 U.S.C. § 
1605A.48 After they had obtained judgment against Iran, however, the 
respondents faced practical and legal difficulties in enforcing the 
judgment against Iran.49 To lessen these difficulties, and to ensure that 
the assets in the particular Bank Markazi case could be seized, 
Congress passed § 502 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 
Rights Act of 2012.50 The Act provides that if a court makes specific 
findings, “a financial asset . . . shall be subject to execution . . . in order 
 
 41.  Audobon, 503 U.S. at 435–36. 
 42.  Id. at 437. 
 43.  Id. at 439. 
 44.  Id. at 440. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  See id. at 439 (“Section 318 did not instruct the courts whether any particular timber 
sales would violate subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5).”). 
 47.  136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016). 
 48.  Id. at 1317, 1319. 
 49.  Id. at 1317–18. 
 50.  Id. at 1318. 
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to satisfy any judgment to the extent of any judgment to the extent of 
any compensatory damages awarded against Iran for damages for 
person injury or death caused by” certain acts of terrorism.51 Another 
section of the Act states that the assets specific to the action in Bank 
Markazi were “available for execution.”52 
Thus, while the case was pending, the Act ensured a certain result 
would come about. This did not violate any constitutional principles 
of separation of powers, the Court ruled, as Congress “changed the 
law by establishing new substantive standards, entrusting to the 
District Court application of those standards to the facts (contested or 
uncontested) found by the court.”53 Congress may direct courts to 
apply new legal standards to undisputed facts, even if the legislation is 
meant to be outcome-altering.54 The Supreme Court noted how a 
court must determine the presence of three factors before allowing 
the seizure of an asset.55 Congress, therefore, did not establish a rule of 
decision; rather, it established a new legal standard.56 
As long as Congress establishes legal standards by which the 
Court shall abide, and does not compel findings or results under old 
law,57 a specific pending case may be specifically mentioned in the 
statute and legislation may be particularized to a specific case.58 
III. HOLDING 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s 
ruling that the Gun Lake Act did not violate constitutional separation 
of powers principles.59 The court of appeals held that Patchak’s 
argument that the Act violated constitutional separation of powers 
principles must fail because the Gun Lake Act changed the 
substantive law applicable to Patchak’s claims.60 The court concluded 
that the Act, through Section 2(a), “has ‘changed the law,’”61 and 
“provides a new legal standard we are obliged to apply: if an action 
 
 51.  Id. at 1318–19. 
 52.  Id. at 1319. 
 53.  Id. at 1326. 
 54.  Id. at 1325. 
 55.  Id. at 1326. 
 56.  Id. at 1325–26. 
 57.  Id. at 1326. 
 58.  Id. at 1327. 
 59.  Patchak v. Jewell, 828 F.3d 995, 999 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 60.  Id. at 1003. 
 61.  Id. (citation omitted). 
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relates to the Bradley Property, it must promptly be dismissed. 
Patchak’s suit is just such an action.”62 
IV. ARGUMENTS 
A. Petitioner’s Arguments 
Petitioner’s arguments are divided into two sections: (1) the Gun 
Lake Act is unconstitutional; and (2) the Court must guard against 
separation of powers violations. 
Regarding the constitutionality of the Gun Lake Act, Petitioner 
first argues that Section 2(b) of the Act did not amend any underlying 
substantive or procedural laws, contrary to Court precedent.63 
Petitioner argues that the Klein Court held that Congress had 
“‘passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial 
power,’ when it ‘directed’ that courts ‘shall forthwith dismiss’ pending 
cases without altering applicable legal standards.”64 Petitioner states 
that “Section 2(b) of the Gun Lake Act did precisely what this Court 
said was impermissible in Klein: it ‘infringed the judicial power . . . 
because it attempted to direct the result without altering the 
[applicable] legal standards.’”65 Without amending the underlying 
substantive or procedural laws in the specific case at hand, Petitioner 
argues, Congress violated the separation of powers and “stand[s] 
apart from those [cases] where the Court rejected separation of 
powers challenges to statutes which amended existing laws, and left 
the courts to apply new legal standards to the cases before them.”66 
Next, Petitioner argues that Congress’s historical practices support 
the view that the Act is unconstitutional.67 Petitioner notes that the 
Court in Zivotofsky v. Kerry “put significant weight upon historical 
practice [of Congress]” in separation of powers cases.68 Finding only 
one other act similar to it in Congressional history, the Act ruled 
unconstitutional in Klein,69 Petitioner argues that the lack of historical 
 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Brief for Petitioner at 12, Patchak v. Zinke, NO. 16-498 (U.S. July 12, 2017) 
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. 
 64.  Id. at 16 (citation omitted). 
 65.  Id. at 17 (citation omitted). 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. at 18. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871). 
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practice, specifically in the context of separation of powers, 
demonstrates the unconstitutionality of the Act.70 
Petitioner also rejects the court of appeals’ conclusion that Section 
2(a) has substantively changed the law.71 Though Section 2(a) does 
state that the statute was enacted “[t]o reaffirm that certain land has 
been taken into trust,” the legal implications of this section are 
unclear.72 Petitioner argues the intent of Section 2(a) is ambiguous, 
and it is not clear if Section 2(a) is meant to take the land into trust, or 
merely as an ex-poste endorsement of the Secretary’s decision.73 If it 
does take the land into trust, what would be the impact on the APA 
claim74—subsequent to the Supreme Court’s decision that Petitioner’s 
APA claim may proceed?75 Petitioner then notes that “[a]bsent a clear 
statement of that intent, we do not give retroactive effect to statutes 
burdening private interests.”76 However, the judicial system cannot 
decide the legal ramifications and interpretations of Section 2(a), as 
Section 2(b) removes from the judiciary the ability to decide the 
issue.77 Therefore, Congress “exercised the judicial power reserved for 
the federal courts by Article III.”78 
Petitioner argues that the act was not jurisdictional.79 Congress 
must make clear its intent to adopt a jurisdictional statute; Petitioner 
asserts that the Act does not state that it is jurisdictional, and that the 
legislative history “corroborates that the statute is not 
jurisdictional.”80 Even if it were jurisdictional, Section 2(b) of the Act 
would violate the separation of powers principle.81 Petitioner cites 
Klein to support his proposition, stating that the Court held Congress 
violated the separation of powers when it passed a statute stating that 
the Court “shall have no further jurisdiction of the cause, and shall 
 
 70.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 63, at 18. 
 71.  Id. at 19. 
 72.  Id. at 19–20. 
 73.  Id. at 20. 
 74.  The APA claim is that the Department of the Interior improperly put the land into 
trust for the Gun Lake Tribe. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. (citing Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 701 (2000)). 
 77.  Id. at 20–21. 
 78.  Id. at 22. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. at 23. 
 81.  See id. at 24 (“Respondents failed to identify any decision from this Court holding that 
Congress’s general power to alter the jurisdiction of the federal court precludes finding a 
particular jurisdiction-stripping statute violates separation of powers principles.”). 
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dismiss the same for want of jurisdiction.”82 Thus, Petitioner asserts, 
“an intrusion on the judicial power disguised as an exercise of 
authority over federal court jurisdiction still constitutes a separation 
of powers violation.”83 
Petitioner goes on to argue that he has been deprived of his 
individual rights, which structural separation of powers principles 
were designed to safeguard.84 By mandating that Petitioner’s case be 
“promptly dismissed,” Congress “stripped Petitioner of his individual 
right to have his claim adjudicated by a neutral judge, free of political 
interference.”85 The separation of powers was designed “to guarantee 
that the process of adjudication itself remain impartial.”86 
Petitioner argues that the Court must guard against such 
separation of powers violations, because “[s]light encroachments 
create new boundaries from which legions of power can seek new 
territory to capture.”87 The Court therefore must “ensure that the 
other branches” confine itself to its proper role.88 Doing so is “a 
responsibility of this Court.”89 
B. Respondents’ Arguments 
Respondents first argue that Congress can withdraw jurisdiction 
over pending suits.90 They explain that “[t]he power of Congress to 
define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts includes 
the authority to withdraw previously given and to subject pending 
cases to the new jurisdictional limitation.”91 Respondents ultimately 
argue that Section 2(b) does just that: it withdraws the jurisdiction of 
 
 82.  Id. at 24–25 (citing United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 143 (1871)). 
 83.  Id. at 25. 
 84.  Id. at 26. 
 85.  Id. at 28. 
 86.  Id. at 26 (citing Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 
58 (1982)). 
 87.  Id. at 29 (quoting Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 502–03 (2011)). 
 88.  Id. at 28 (quoting City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1886 (2013) (Roberts, J., 
dissenting)). 
 89.  Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)). 
 90.  See Brief for Respondent at 16, Patchak v. Zinke, NO. 16-498 (U.S. Sept. 11, 2017) 
[hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. “As the Court has explained, jurisdiction that has been 
conferred ‘may, at the will of Congress, be taken away in whole or in part; and if withdrawn 
without a saving clause all pending cases though cognizable when commenced must fall.’” Id. 
(citing Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922)). 
 91.  Id. 
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the federal court, and it is thus “a valid exercise of Congress’s power 
to define and limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts.”92 
Respondents reject Petitioner’s contention that the jurisdictional 
nature of a statute must be clearly stated, as the Court has accepted 
less direct language to be “clear” in the past.93 They note that the 
Court has found that the phrase “an appeal may not be taken to the 
court of appeals” without a certification of appealability, is “clear 
jurisdictional language.”94 Respondents equate this language with that 
in the Gun Lake Act, which states that any action relating to the 
Bradley Property “shall not be filed or maintained” in a federal 
court.95 Thus, “[t]he provision falls squarely within this Court’s 
precedent acknowledging Congress’s authority to define the 
jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts.”96 
Additionally, according to Respondents, Section 2(b) withdraws 
the United States’ general waiver of sovereign immunity in the APA 
for any action relating to the Bradley Property. Respondents first note 
that the APA is a general waiver by the United States allowing the 
government to be sued for actions by administrative agencies.97 
However, the United States “may ‘withdraw the consent at any 
time.’”98 Here, Respondents characterize Section 2(b) as a “broad 
grant of immunity from lawsuits pertaining to the Bradley Property.”99 
In addressing whether the Act violates constitutional separation of 
powers principles, Respondents note three limitations on what 
Congress may do. Congress may not (1) interpret and apply law to a 
certain case; (2) give the Executive the ability to review the decisions 
of Article III courts; or (3) reverse a final judgment of an Article III 
court or direct the court to reopen a case.100 
Respondents contend that the Gun Lake Act changes the law 
applicable to pending cases, rather than directing a result in this 
certain case.101 Respondents distinguish this case from Klein, upon 
 
 92.  Id. at 19. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. at 21 (quoting Gonzales v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134 (2012)). 
 95.  See id. at 11 (“[T]he Court has previously concluded that statutory provisions similar to 
Section 2(b) of the Gun Lake Act stated a jurisdictional limitation.”). 
 96.  Id. at 23. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. at 25 (citing Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 581 (1934)). 
 99.  Id. at 27 (citation omitted). 
 100.  Id. at 28. 
 101.  See id. at 29–30 (“As Chief Justice Marshall explained in United States v. Schooner 
Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801), ‘if subsequent to the judgment and before the decision 
FISHER FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE) 3/22/2018  1:33 PM 
96 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 13 
which Petitioner rely, by explaining that in Klein, the Court dealt with 
a statute in which Congress directed the result of the case without 
altering the legal standards “governing the effect of a pardon—
standards Congress was powerless to prescribe.”102 Unlike the Gun 
Lake Act, where Congress was authorized to change jurisdiction, in 
Klein, Congress was not even authorized in the first instance to 
construe for courts how a pardon might be interpreted in terms of 
evidence of loyalty or disloyalty.103 Respondents also note that Klein 
does not prevent Congress from “amend[ing] the law in a way that 
makes the outcome virtually certain in a specific case, as long as 
Congress does not institute a rule of decision that le[aves] the court 
no adjudicatory function to perform.”104 
Section 2(b) does not institute a rule of decision. Instead, it 
prescribes a new legal standard for courts to apply: if the action 
relates to the Bradley property, the suit must be dismissed.105 
Petitioner’s reliance on the fact that the Senate and House reports 
stated that the Act made no “changes in existing law” is misplaced, as 
the language “merely indicates that enactment of the Gun Lake Act 
did not require the actual amendment of any already-existing 
statute.”106 Petitioner’s reliance on the fact that the Act did not amend 
any generally applicable statute is also misplaced, as the Court has 
stated in the past that such a change is not necessary.107 
Additionally, Section 2(b) does not direct a particular outcome 
under existing law. Again seeking to distinguish Klein, Respondents 
note that federal courts are left to apply on their own whether a suit is 
related to the Bradley Property.108 This is unlike Klein, where 
Congress was directing the federal courts to apply facts in a certain 
way to ensure a certain party would have a favorable outcome in the 
case.109 Because the Gun Lake Act states that a suit must promptly be 
dismissed, the Act ensures that no party receives a judgment on the 
 
of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the law 
must be obeyed, or its obligation denied.’”). 
 102.  Id. at 32 (quoting United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 148 (1871)). 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. at 29. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. at 35. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. at 36. 
 109.  Id. 
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merits.110 Congress, then, is not directing the courts to decide a case 
one way or another. 
Finally, Respondent argued that it does not matter that the 
Supreme Court has previously stated that the petitioner’s act “may 
proceed” because “Congress’s subsequent enactment of the Gun 
Lake Act amended the law applicable to petitioner’s claim.”111 The 
decision that Petitioner’s claim may proceed was not a final judgment 
in the case: it was at an “interlocutory stage” of the case and 
“therefore did not diminish the power of Congress to eliminate 
jurisdiction over a category of cases that includes petitioner’s suit.”112 
V. ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence suggests that the Court will 
affirm the decision of the D.C. Circuit and hold that the Gun Lake Act 
did not violate any separation of powers principles. In its most recent 
separation of powers cases, the Court has found no violation of 
seperation of powers principles when Congress has left some fact-
finding to the trier of fact and when Congress has not prescribed a 
rule of decision.113 
Here, the Court will likely find that there was a change in 
substantive law. Like the statute in Bank Markazi, the Gun Lake Act 
implemented a new legal standard to be implemented by a presiding 
court: if a legal suit involves the Bradley Property, it must be 
dismissed.114 The Court’s language in Bank Markazi is applicable here: 
just as when a court must first determine “if Iran owns certain 
assets,”115 the courts here must first determine if a suit is related to the 
Bradley Property; only then must the suit “be promptly dismissed.”116 
 
 110.  Id. at 40. 
 111.  Id. at 41. 
 112.  Id. at 42 (citing Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 
567 U.S. 209, 212 (2012)). 
 113.  Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1326 (2016) (“In short, § 8772 changed the 
law by establishing new substantive standards, entrusting to the District Court application of 
those standards to the facts (contested or uncontested) found by the court . . . § 8772 provides a 
new standard clarifying that, if Iran owns certain assets, the victims of Iran-sponsored terrorist 
attacks will be permitted to execute against those assets.”). 
 114.  See Patchak v. Jewell, 828 F.3d 995, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“More to the point, Section 
2(b) provides a new legal standard we are obliged to apply: if an action relates to the Bradley 
Property, it must promptly be dismissed.”). 
 115.  Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1326. 
 116.  Gun Lake Act, Pub. L. No. 113-179, 128 Stat. 1913, Sec. 2(b) (2014).  
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Many of the Petitioner’s arguments fail to persuade. Petitioner 
relies heavily on a misguided interpretation of United States v. Klein.117 
Petitioner asserts that Klein stands for the proposition that “an 
intrusion on the judicial power disguised as an exercise of authority 
over federal court jurisdiction still constitutes a separation of powers 
violation.”118 However, the Court in Bank Markazi made it clear that 
the issue in Klein was not that Congress attempted to alter the 
decision of a case by stripping federal jurisdiction, but rather that 
Congress was not authorized to interfere with the President’s power 
to pardon.119 In other words, Klein recognized that Congress in the 
first instance did not have any constitutional authority to enact 
legislation on the topic. Here, however, Petitioner is alleging that 
there are constitutional prohibitions on enacting such legislation. 
And, as mentioned, when considering the statutes that were 
deemed to not be prohibited by separation of powers principles in 
Bank Markazi and Audobon, the Court here will likely determine 
there has been a substantive change in the law applicable to the case 
at hand. Respondents’ argument in this regard is convincing. As 
Respondents note, the federal judicial system’s role is to determine in 
any case whether a suit involves the Bradley Property.120 Congress 
does not direct a finding that the specific case at hand be found to 
involve the Bradley Property. That determination is left to the courts. 
Simply allowing that determination to be left to the courts seems to 
satisfy the Court that there has in fact been a change to the 
substantive law.121 Of course, it also does not matter that Congress 
passed this statute with this suit in mind, and intended and hoped for 
a specific ruling.122 In these types of cases, it satisfies the Court that 
there has been a change in substantive law, since they have held 
“[a]pplying laws implementing Congress’ policy judgments, with 
fidelity to those judgments, is commonplace for the Judiciary.”123 
 
 117.  80 U.S. 128 (1871). 
 118.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 63, at 25. 
 119.  See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 147 (1871) (“The rule prescribed is also liable 
to just exception as impairing the effect of a pardon, and thus infringing the constitutional 
power of the Executive.”). 
 120.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 90, at 19. 
 121.  See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1326 (2016) (“In short, § 8772 changed 
the law by establishing new substantive standards, entrusting to the District Court application of 
those standards to the facts (contested or uncontested) found by the court.”). 
 122.  See id. at 1325 (“In any event, a statute does not impinge on judicial power when it 
directs courts to apply a new legal standard to undisputed facts.”). 
 123.  Id. at 1326. 
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Adding strength to this argument is that this suit is against the 
United States, not an individual person. The United States “may 
‘withdraw the consent [to be sued]’ at any time.”124 Given Congress’s 
broad power to decide when, where, and whether the United States is 
consenting to being sued for official acts of government officials, it is 
hard to see a way in which the Court will find the Act in question 
violated separation of powers principles. Viewed in the context of 
sovereign immunity, the Gun Lake Act supplies a standard by which a 
court may determine that Congress has withdrawn the ability of the 
United States to be sued. 
The strength of the Government’s arguments in Patchak, however, 
should not be conflated with the integrity of the Act as a piece of 
legislation. Regardless of prior doctrine, the Court should prohibit the 
Act due to separation of powers principles.125 
There are countervailing principles that are causes for concern in 
this case. First, the Gun Lake Act is unlike the statute in question in 
Bank Markazi. In Bank Markazi, there were three factors the court 
had to apply before determining whether an asset belonged to Iran.126 
Here, however, the Gun Lake Act provides no standards by which a 
court can determine whether a suit involves the Bradley Property. 
Congress has instituted a bill with a watered-down version of a 
change in substantive law. Second, unlike the statutes in Bank 
Markazi and Audobon, the statute in question here results in an 
outright dismissal of the case—there is little or no litigating to be 
done, and thus little opportunity for a plaintiff’s case to be heard. 
But, because Congress has been able to technically enact a change 
in substantive law, a direct application of Supreme Court precedent 
will most likely prevent the petitioner from successfully arguing there 
has been a separation of powers violation. The outright dismissal of 
Petitioner’s (and perhaps in another case, the respondent’s) claim—
not seen in Bank Markazi or Audobon—will prevent him from 
 
 124.  Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 581 (1934). 
 125.  See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 125 (1981) 
(“Subject of course to constitutional constraints, the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is 
subject to the plenary control of Congress.”) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 126.  See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1319 (“Before allowing execution against an asset 
described in § 8772(b), a court must determine that the asset is: ‘(A) held in the United States 
for a foreign securities intermediary doing business in the United States; (b) a blocked asset 
(whether or not subsequently unblocked . . .; and (C) equal in value to a financial asset of Iran, 
including an asset of the central bank or monetary authority of the Government of Iran.’”) 
(citation omitted). 
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bringing equitable claims to court. That this case involves sovereign 
immunity is equally alarming—it might allow Congress to shield itself 
and government officials from suit in pending litigation whenever the 
outcome of the litigation appears dire for the government. The 
principle of separation of powers is a hallmark of our constitutional 
system, and is meant to safeguard individual liberty.127 This case, then, 
should be a call for the Court to drop the formulaic application of 
rules to separation of powers cases, and instead adopt a functional 
approach whereby the Court looks at the overall effect a decision 
might have on the whole system of governance.128 
Applying formulaic rules in cases that raise fundamental 
constitutional principles leaves the Court little opportunity to 
consider the exigencies and unique circumstances of specific fact 
patterns. “At issue here is a basic principle, not a technical rule.”129 
Enabling Congress to fit its actions into standardized formula will 
allow Congress to fulfill its “tendency to ‘extend[] the sphere of its 
activity and draw[] all power into its impetuous vortex.’”130 The Gun 
Lake Act is an example of Congress attempting to “extend the sphere 
of its activity.”131 While in Bank Markazi, Congress articulated three 
elements that had to be found in order for the rule to apply, the Gun 
Lake Act provides no such guidance. Standardized rules, rather than 
functional principles, have thus enabled Congress to find new ways to 
directly affect the outcome of pending legislation. 
CONCLUSION 
Patchak v. Zinke provides a perfect opportunity for the Supreme 
Court to reverse its course and drop the formulaic approach to certain 
separation of powers issues. Instead, the Supreme Court should adopt 
a functionalist approach. With formulaic rules in place governing such 
cases, it is easy for Congress to affect pending legislation in a 
particular way, especially litigation that implicates the United States. 
The ease with which Congress can undermine judicial 
decisionmaking—as shown through Patchak v. Zinke—must come to 
an end. 
 
 127.  See id. at 1330 (“The separation of powers, in turn, safeguards individual freedom.”) 
(Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 128.  See id. at 1338 (“At issue here is a basic principle, not a technical rule.”) (Roberts, J., 
dissenting). 
 129.  Id. (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 130.  Id. at 1338 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (J. Madison)). 
 131.  Id. (Roberts, J., dissenting) (citation and alterations omitted). 
